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The year 1997 marked a significant change in the history of Hong Kong, for it 
was returned to China after 156 years of British control, and became a Special 
Administrative Region (SAR) of the People's Republic of China. While the territory 
was still a British colony, it was considered a stronghold for liberal journalism in Asia. 
Since the years leading to the handovcr, mainland Chinese officials have criticised the 
Hong Kong press for abusing tlie laissez-faire media environment. The flamboyant 
style of the Hong Kong media contradicted the rigid, socialist ideology of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). As the handover drew closer, the differences between the 
social and political systems became even starker. 
This thesis likens China's growing interference in the Hong Kong press and the 
SAR's corresponding resistance to a game of 'tug-of war', with the meaning of the 
word 'press' in 'press freedom' being narrowed down to 'print newspapers'. It explores 
the controversy over Beijing's alleged infringements on the territory's press freedom, by 
studying three cases involving mainland intervention that occurred during the first four 
years after the handover. Meanwhile, it stresses that the future of a liberal press in 
Hong Kong should neither be seen as gloomy nor impossible, by showing how local 
defenders of a free press have responded to the three incidents. In addition, this thesis 
provides an insight on the importance of preserving press freedom in Hong Kong, as 
well a~ how China and the SAR can reach a compromise on this issue. 
In contrast to other work in this area which often highlights the fact that Hong 
Kong's press freedom has been increasingly under threat and would probably vanish 
altogether, this thesis hopes to provide a new interpretation of this problematic issue in 
an optimistic way. It also wishes to offer the reader a better understanding of what is 
meant by press freedom in Hong Kong. 
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The future of press freedom in Hong Kong hung in the balance when on 151 July 
1996, more than twenty reporters from the territory were detained in Beijing. They 
were there to cover a story of a group of Hong Kong activists who intended to deliver a 
petition to the Chinese government, protesting against the establishment of a provisional 
legislature that would replace the elected body afler the handover (Fong, 1996). The 
reporters were detained on the count of covering news 'illegally' without Chinese 
consent, and were forced to write statements of confession and repentance. The 
journalists feared being blacklisted by the Chinese government, and were also worried 
about China's stand on the territory's press freedom after this incident. 
Four years have passed; with the journalists' fear being intensified by three 
major attacks on the SAR media from China in the year 2000. These incidents raised 
concerns about a gradual erosion of press freedom and the increasing practice of self-
censorship and censorship. Chapter One discusses these three cases in relation to the 
highly debated topic of self-censorship and censorship. While the Hong Kong 
Journalists Association (HKJA) has repeatedly pointed out the existence of self-
censorship among the SAR news outlets in its annual reports since 1994, Liu ( 1997) and 
Zeitlin (2001) attribute the toning down of China coverage in certain newspapers to 
censorship exercised by the editorial and management level. Using the three cases, this 
chapter argues that the arguments of both sides are valid. I will conduct a qualitative 
analysis of how these cases were covered by two local Chinese-language newspapers 
Apple Daily and Ming Pao (which are very different in nature from each other), as well 
as the territory's leading English-language daily the South China Morning Post (SCMP). 
These three papers are chosen due to the following reasons. Chinese-language 
papers are read by the local Hong Kong population, which is made up of approximately 
95 percent of ethnic Chinese (Central Intelligence Agency, 2001). Apple Daily is one of 
the best-selling newspapers in the city, which is no mean feat for a paper that was 
established in 1995 by pro-freedom entrepreneur Jimmy Lai Chi Ying. It is viewed as 
'anti-China' since its confrontational attitude towards the Chinese government can be 
seen in its comments and features. On the other hand, Ming Pao Is a more venerable 
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paper which won the loyalty of the territory's intellectuals and middle-class. Although 
it was once classified as 'hostile' by China's official Xinhua News Agency for its 
aggressive coverage on the Tiananmen Square incident, it is observed to have started 
softening its voice when the handover was approaching (Kahn, 1997). Similarly, the 
SCMP is believed to have been taking a less antagonistic stance towards Hong Kong's 
new master (Stone, 1998, p.l60). It will be used as a main example to illustrate the 
conflicts between the political directions of the press and the press owners' business 
interests in the mainland. 
In contrast, Chapter Tvw-'o explores the brighter side of the situation of press 
freedom in Hong Kong. The inclusion of this chapter, which also explains the main 
reason of writing this thesis, is due to the fact that little has been written to present the 
future of press freedom in the SAR in an optimistic way. In fact, many Hongkongers 
value freedom of the press as much as their western counterparts do, and some of them 
have actually been putting great effort in fighting for press freedom. Evidence can be 
cited in responses (both verbal comments and legal actions) from well-known local 
press freedom advocates to the three incidents mentioned in Chapter One. These 
responses will appear in the first half of this chapter. The second half emphasises that 
local media outlets generally support press freedom, regardless of their political 
orientations. To achieve this, I will again employ the method of qualitative analysis, 
with the focus on the editorials on two of those three cases by Apple Daily, Ming Pao 
and the South China Morning Post. 
To understand these press freedom advocates' persistence on fighting for press 
freedom, it is necessary to understand the importance of preserving press freedom in 
Hong Kong. Many critics who have touched on this topic tend to put their emphasis on 
the economic factor. For instance, Neumann (1997) repeatedly stresses that the free 
flow of infonnation, facilitated by minimal restrictions on the press, is essential for the 
SAR to retain its status as an international financial market; Bowring (1997, p.23) and 
Wrout (1997, p.l64) reach a consensus tl1;~t Hong Kong's press freedom has given the 
territory an advantage over Singapore, e.,~-!t being the other's major competitor as a 
regional hub in East Asia. Certainly, press freedom plays a vital part in the territory's 
economic succ€:ss, but its significance is far more than that. 
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Neumann, Bowring ami Wrout's arguments will be developed in greater detail to 
fonn part of Chapter Three, which assesses the importance of preserving press freedom 
in Hong Kong based on the hypothetical scenario that press freedom was taken away 
from the city. Certain relevant current affairs will be discussed so as to provide a new 
dimension of examining the relationship between press freedom and the SAR's 
economy. In addition, I will approach the topic by looking from the social and political 
angles, at both a smaller and larger scale. Supportive arguments for the prediction of 
the impacts of the loss of press freedom on the SARjoumalistic circle will draw heavily 
from the studies by Chan, Lee and Lee ( 1996), which focus on Hong Kong journalists 
during the transition period. When discussing the social and political implications on 
the community as a whole, academic texts on Hong Kong's social and political history 
such as works by McMillen (1993) and by Chan and Lee (1999) will be referred to. 
The Chinese government's dismissive stance towards the importance of press 
freedom shows up the still highly divergent views on this issue. It points to the Chinese 
leaders' "dangerously insufficient understanding of Hong Kong" (Yahuda, 1997, p.204). 
In his article, Yahuda identifies some fundamental differences between the two places 
in order to illustrate how China could deepen its integration into the international 
community if it understood the territory better. Taking a similar approach, I will 
elaborate on some of the differences and misunderstandings between China and Hong 
Kong that have resulted in the 'tug-of-war' over press freedom in Chapter Four. In 
particular, I will argue that Hong Kong is also responsible for this ongoing battle due to 
its lack of understanding of its motherland. 
These differences and misunderstandings will be classified into three mam 
categories: political beliefs and ideologies, differing interpretations of important 
concepts, and the media's perception of social responsibility. Ting's (1993) article on 
China's economic development and Morikawa's (n.d.) study on China's political nature 
are useful information sources for explaining China's apparently anti-western mentality. 
George's (2000) book on Singapore's politics, which mentions some of the shared 
attitudes between Singaporeans and mainland Chinese, will also be referred to. In terms 
of articulating Hongkongers' general political beliefs, I will heavily draw my arguments 
from literature specialising in identity fonnation and political movements in Hong Kong, 
such as work by Thomas (1999) and work by Ma and Fung (1999). 
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By analysing China's own interpretation of the tenn 'freedom of the press', 
Foster (1997) asserts that China's promise of press freedom to Hong Kong is "illusory". 
However, this could be attributed to misunderstandings between China and Hong Kong 
because of their different interpretations of 'press freedom'. Observers who have 
singled out other 'problematic' but important tenns include DeGolyer (1993, p.274), 
Morikawa (n.d.) and Harris (1998, p.234). Aside from the Hong Kong definitions of 
certain important tenns, what China also needs to understand is the SAR media's 
perception of social responsibility. This idea came in the wake of the local media's 
strong response to a speech given by Chinese President Jiang Zemin at the celebration 
of the first anniversary of Macau's return to China. Jiang advised the media in both 
Hong Kong and Macau to heed their social responsibility, of which the SCMP 
concluded with three words: "toe the line" (Lee, No & Bruning, 2000). To the SAR 
media, which are strongly western-influenced in general, this is certainly unacceptable. 
Chapter Four will explore this topic at e. greater length by applying Chan, Lee and Lee's 
(1996) studies on the professionalism of Hong Kong journalists and other relevant 
literature. 
Ch>~pter One 10 
CHAPTER ONE 
Casting a Shadow: China's Interference 
During the first two and half years after the handover, the media in Hong Kong 
seemed to be free of Chinese interference. There were neither major attacks on the 
media, nor arrests of journalists. However, serious infringements occurred in the year 
2000, where three incidents highlighted the precariousness of the territory's press 
freedom. 
This chapter aims at measuring the extent of China's intervention in the SAR's 
media in the four years after 1997. It examines the practice of self-censorship and 
censorship, which is a highly debated topic in Hong Kong. To achieve these, the three 
cases will be discussed and analysed, with the main focus on the last case. In addition, 
there will be a brief qualitative analysis of how these cases were covered by three local 
newspapers: Apple Daily, South China Morning Post and Ming Pao. 
The three major cases involved: 
• Wang Fengchao, a Beijing official who warned the Hong Kong media against pro-
Taiwan reporting on 121h April 2000. 
• Chinese President Jiang Zemin, who lashed out at the SAR media on 281h October 
2000. 
• Willy Lam Wo Lap, a China editor who was forced to resign on 61h November 2000, 
apparently for one of his 'sensitive' column on China. 
These three cases are all evidence of interference from China and can be 
classified into two categories: explicit and implicit intervention. Explicit intervention 
refers to comments on and actions against the SAR's media by Chinese officials; 
implicit interference can be seen in areas of press ownership, self-censorship and 
censorship. The Wang Fengchao and President Jiang incidents clearly belong to the 
first group, whereas Willy Lam's replacement belongs to the latter. 
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Implications of implicit interference- Case study of Willy Lam's removal from the 
South China Morning Post 
In fact, what was, and still is, really influencing the SAR journalistic circle is 
implicit interference in editorial decisions. This is where Beijing's mostly subtle but 
sometimes heavy-handed actions come in. The Hong Kong Journalists Association's 
(HKJA) 1995 report documents various methods that the Chinese government has 
employed to secure greater obedience from the Hong Kong's /aissez{aire media in the 
run-up to the Chinese rule (Hong Kong Journalists Association [HKJA] & Article 19, 
1995, p.23). These methods, also known as 'inside policies', which will be dealt with 
below, were revealed in an interview with Kam Yiu Yu in October 1993 (HKJA & 
Article 19, p.23). Kam was the former chief editor of the communist-controlled Hong 
Kong daily Wen Wei Po. Indeed, evidence of such implicit interference from China can 
be cited in the Willy Lam case, as well as several changes within the South China 
Morning Post (SCMP or the Post) prior to the handover. It is necessary to provide 
background information on the Lam case before any further discussion: 
Background information on Willy Lam's removal 
Veteran journalist Willy Lam Wo Lap quit the South China Morning Post (on 6ili 
November 2000) rather than being sidelined. Having worked for Hong Kong's leading 
English-language daily for over ten years, Lam resigned with disappointment and 
dissatisfaction. He was notified that his job as the paper's China editor would be given 
to fanner China Daily reporter Wang Xiangwei. Lam's replacement was believed to be 
a result of a column he wrote in June 2000, where he alleged that mainland Chinese 
government officials agreed to offer favours to 36 Hong Kong business tycoons if they 
pledged their support for the Beijing-appointed SAR Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa 
("Resign under pressure", 2000). This article became a target of the SCMP's major 
shareholder Robert Kuok Hock Nien, who published a hostile letter in the paper 
slanuning Lam's column as an exaggeration futl of "distortions and speculation" 
("Regional briefing", 2000, p.l4). The Post's chairman Kuok Khoon Ean (Robert 
Kuok's son) emphasised that the organisational change was "purely an editorial 
management decision", aiming at "expanding and diversifying the paper's China 
coverage" ("Veteran journalist", 2000). 
Chapter One 12 
Beijing's first application of the inside tactics on the Post could be seen in the 
sale of the paper from media baron Rupert Murdoch to pro-China billionaire Robert 
Kuok Hock Nien in September 1993. Few people believed that the takeover of the 
SCMP by Robert Kuok was simply a swapping of masters. This was largely due to his 
background- a Malaysian Chinese businessman with close ties to mainland officials and 
extensive investments in China such as deluxe hotels, property development, and Coca-
Cola bottling projects (Karp, 1993a, p.ll). Coupled with Kuok's acknowledgement of 
the purchase being "facilitated by the Bank of China which provided temporary 
bridging loans" (Stone, 1998, p.l61), an inside tactic that Kam refers to as "acting on 
the 'economic bases"' of Hong Kong's media seems applicable in this case (HKJA & 
Article 19, 1995, p.24). This particular method means that China will encourage pro-
Beijing investors to purchase a controlling stake in individual newspapers or media 
groups on their behalf, in order to gain control of editorial policy (HKJA & Article 19, 
p.24). The issue of press ownership has also led to a question of self-censorship and 
censorship, which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Many were also bewildered as to the reason why Rupert Murdoch decided to 
divest himself of the highly profitable daily, wondering about the political implications 
of the deal. One of Murdoch's ambitions was to bring his Hong Kong-based regional 
satellite broadcaster Star TV into the growing China market (Gilley, 2000, p.30). This 
was certainly a big challenge for him owing to China's wariness of her citizens being 
'corrupted' by pro-democracy Western ideologies. Many analysts believed that 
Murdoch had sold the SCMP in the fear that the paper's pro-British stance would thwart 
his plan of entering China (Stone, 1998, p.l59). Indeed, according to the then SCMP 
editor Jonathan Fenby, the Post was the "colonial mouthpiece, whose editor would go to 
tea with the Governor once or twice a week and come back and write those editorials" 
(Wrout, 1997, p.l63). Other moves to gain Beijing's favour included pulling the BBC's 
24-hour news channel from Star TV, for it had upset China (Gilley, p.31). In addition, 
Murdoch cancelled a book contract with Christopher Patten, Hong Kong's last governor 
and a pro-democracy advocate. Murdoch openly admitted the political motivation 
behind it: "We're trying to get set up in China. Why should we upset them?" (Gilley, 
p.31). 
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Although Robert Kuok has never been as blunt as Murdoch in terms of 
admitting moves of befriending China for economic gains in the mainland, the changes 
in the SCMP were somewhat perplexing. In April 1997, Feng Xiliang, the founding 
editor of Beijing's official English-language newspaper China Daily, was appointed to 
the Post as a 'consultant' (HKJA & Article 19, 1997, p.20). China Daily is notably the 
mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Part) (CCP}, and is uncter the control of the 
Central Committee's Propaganda Department (Haggart, 1992, p.50). This appointment 
matched the characteristics of what Kam refers to as 'undercover agents', where loyal 
CCP members, who are often experienced journalists of either official or semi~official 
media organisations, are sent to work for newspapers in Hong Kong, usually in the 
China news section (HKJA & Article 19, 1995, p.24). It sparked controversy about the 
Post's editorial independence, although the then SCMP editor Jonathan Fenby declared 
that a consultant would not affect his full authority to edit the paper (HKJA & Article 19, 
1997, p.20). Something similar happened in the Willy Lam case, where former China 
Daily business reporter Wang Xiangwei had taken over Lam's editorial position. Again, 
this 'organisational change' worried the SAR media because the new China editor 
would have operational and editorial control over all Post correspondents in Hong Kong 
and China who cover Chinese affairs ("Veteran journalist", 2000). 
It is also important to point out that Willy Lam was not the first 'problematic' 
writer to be removed from the Post. Cartoonist Larry Feign's twelve-year-old strip The 
World of Lily Wong was axed in May 1995, after it suggested a citizen who agreed that 
the then Chinese Premier Li Peng "is a fascist, murderous dog" was killed (HK.JA & 
Article 19, 1995, p.35). Similar to Lam, Feign had dealt with subjects which were of 
extreme sensitivity to China. While the SCMP claimed that the decision to scrub the 
strip was for financial reasons, Feign contended that it did not make sense for the editor 
to cut costs by dropping his most popular feature (Cohen, 1997, p.4). It is hard to 
believe that the removal of two gutsy columnists and the appointment of two mainland 
'consultants' are pure coincidence. In fact, the recurrences are more likely to be a 
reinforcement of one alarming signal: toe the line or you are out. 
The Chinese government not only dedicates a particular set of policies to dealing 
with the Hong Kong media, but also applies the same tactics that it uses to gain control 
of the mainland's media to the SAR from time to time. Once again, this observation can 
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be proved by examining the Willy Lam case. After his resignation from the Post, Lam 
revealed in an 'Inside Media' program that editors of the newspapers receive subtle 
messages from Beijing, where "a media magnate might be invited to dinner with a high 
ranking government official who just 'casually' makes a critical comment about a 
certain article" (Arvidson, 2000). This emulates what the Chinese leaders do to gain 
control of the mainland media, where they arrange: regular meetings at which the chief 
editors are told what they should or should nut publish (Haggart, 1992, p.52). To 
Beijing, giving frequent advice is actually an act of benevolence. According to Haggart 
(1992, p.53), the Propaganda Department will simply remove obstinate chief editors 
they find hard to tolerate. Apparently, many people, including Lam himself, believe 
that that is what happened to him. 
Willy Lam's removal was certainly a blow to the freedom of the SAR's media. 
It intensified the conflict between press ownership and personal business interests, as 
discussed above; it also led to a current debate on self-censorship and censorship in the 
media, which has been running since several years before the handover. Chan and To 
(1999, p.467) observe that as 1997 was approaching, the Beijing government rose as an 
alternative power centre in Hong Kong. As a result, many local journalists adopted the 
practice of self-censorship on China's coverage out of ensuring job-security. A study 
on local journalists' hesitation on criticising China revealed that there were journalists 
who acknowledged apprehension (Chan, Lee & Lee, 1996, p.!19). Chan, Lee and Lee 
(1996, p.120) suggested the figures were "somewhat of an understatement" since self-
censorship was considered "professionally despicable". Another strong .mpporter of 
this argument is the HKJA, which has repeatedly confirmed the existence of self-
censorship among the Hong Kong media in its annual reports on freedom of expression, 
as well r.s its annual anniversary magazines. 
On the other hand, there are those who strongly oppose the claim that 'self-
censorship poses the greatest threat to Hong Kong's press freedom'. Liu (1997) 
suggests that frontline journalists seldom censor themselves. Their 'sensitive' stories 
are usually 'spiked' by the editorial or management level. Thus, what has been 
disturbing the territory's journalistic circle is actually "plain old censorship". Prior to 
the handover, there were several incidents to support this argument. For example, 
SCMP columnist Christine Loh Kung Wai apparently touched on the controversial sale 
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of the Post to Robert Kuok in one of her original articles. The article raised questions 
about press freedom in Hong Kong and was rejected by the daily's editors (Karp, 1993b, 
p.94). Loh, who was also an outspoken liberal in the colonial legislature, defended 
herself against the accusation of criticising the sale. Meanwhile, she admitted that it 
would be naiVe to assume the purchase was purely for commercial reasons, simply by 
looking at Kuok's business background (Karp, 1993b, p.94). Loh's counterpart 
Margaret Ng encountered the same problem, where her column on press freedom was 
rejected by the Post during the transition period of the purchase (Karp, !993a, p.ll ). 
Lam's removal is a more recent example that can be used to further enforce the 
validityofLiu's argument. Lam himself was an editor, in the position to decide what 
gets published and what does not. Moreover, he was not subject to the same editorial 
checks and vetting that junior journalists are. This is why his article on Beijing's 
meeting with Hong Kong tycoons got published without being scanned and censored. If 
it was, the skirmish would not have happened and he would not have been stripped of 
his editorial post. However, Lam was subject to censorship of a different kind - from 
the management level. Instead of having his article spiked or amended, he was simply 
removed from the China news desk. 
Taking the same stance as Liu is Arnold Zeitlin, the chairman of the Freedom 
Forum Asian Centre. Zeitlin, as cited in Kubiske (2000, p.38), arg'les that self-
censorship is a problem in many countries, and that there is a lack of substantial 
evidence to demonstrate that self-censorship on China coverage is widely practiced in 
Hong Kong (Zeitlin, 2001). He defends the professionalism of the territory'sjoumalists, 
saying that they have covered 'sensitive issues' in a ''balanced manner" (Zeitlin, 2001 ). 
While there might not be a preponderance of evidence, the word 'balanced' 
already implies a sense of compromise. This sense of compromise entails either self-
censorship or censorship, but no one can put a finger on what the situation really is. 
Therein lies the question of whether the 'balanced' report was brought about by an order 
from the editorial level, or through veiled threats. The ambivalent concept of 'being 
balanced' can be examined by comparing how Willy Lam's removal was covered by the 
SCMP, Apple Daily and Ming Pao. 
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Both Apple Daily and Ming Pew accompanied the news of Lam's resignation 
with reports of the 'war of words' he had with Robert Kuok in June 2000. The two 
dailies also ran articles on the opinions of certain free press advocates, who generally 
reached a consensus that the removal was politically motivated. For instance, Apple 
Daily quoted the Hong Kong Journalists Association, which suspected that Lam's 
"abrupt departure" might involve "pressure from the outside" (Wong, 2000a). The 
association was worried that the event would affect the international image of Hong 
Kong. In addition to quoting the HKJA, Ming Pao quoted local democrat Martin Lee 
Chu Ming, who demanded an explanation from the Post for its "suspicious move" 
("Resign under pressure", 2000). It is noteworthy that both papers published Willy 
Lam's announcement, which said that Lam himself felt "distorted" about the Post's 
decision oiremoving him from the China desk. He believed that the event would have 
a dulling effect on the territory's press freedom (Wong, 2000a). 
On the contrary, the SCMP's coverage on this 'internal affair' was rather muted. 
It emphasised that the replacement of Lam was an organisational reshuffle ("Enhanced 
coverage", 2000), and felt sorry about his subsequent resignation ("Veteran journalist", 
2000). The Post did r.ot mention anything about the skirmish between Willy Lam and 
Robert Kook, nor did it reflect any sceptical views from anyone. It appears that if the 
Post adopted a policy of self-censorship or censorship with regard to its coverage. 
Which one it exactly was, only those at the Post would know. 
Beijing, press proprietor and coverage- Case studies of Wang Fengchao's 
Remarks and President Jiang's 'lecture' 
The topic on self-censorship or censorship is often linked to the growing trend of 
independent newspapers being bought over by businessmen with substantial economic 
interests in the mainland (HKJA & Article 19, 2001, p.II). In the light of Robert 
Kook's background, it is no surprise that every internal change within the SCMP is 
perceived as proprietorial influence. Indeed, the relationship between the proprietor's 
principles and the paper's political direction is sometimes reflected in the paper's 
coverage. A comparison among the headlines of the reports on the Wang and Jiang 
events by Apple Daily, the SCMP and Ming Pao appear to be a good illustration. 
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Background information on Wang Fengchao 's remarks 
At a seminar organised by the Hong Kong Federation of Journalists, deputy 
director of China's local liaison office (formerly the Xinhua News Agency Hong Kong 
Branch) Wang Fengchao issued a grave warning to Hong Kong's media regarding the 
coverage of Taiwan's political status. He asse:1ed that "the media should not treat 
speeches and views which advocat~ Taiwan's independence as normal news items, nor 
should they report them like normal cases of reporting the voices of different parties" 
(Ma & Political Desk, 2000). He went on to say that the local media are responsible 
for upholding the integrity and sovereignty of the People's Republic of China (Ma & 
Political Desk, 2000). It is believed that Wang was referring to an interview conducted 
with Taiwan's pro-independence Vice-president Annette Lu Hsiu Lien by Hong Kong-
based Cable Television. He insisted that his remarks had nothing to do with press 
freedom. 
Background infonnation on President Jiang's 'lecture' 
In a meeting with the SAR Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa in October 2000, 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin lashed out at Hong Kong journalists when he was asked 
whether it was an 'imperial order' for Tung to serve a second tenn. In an 
uncharacteristic outburst of anger, President Jiang accused the journalists of undue 
aggressive questioning, saying that they lacked knowledge and kept asking "simple and 
narve" questions (Ching, 2000). He also criticised their professionalism, saying that 
the only thing good about them was that they could run faster then their Western 
counterparts (Ching, 2000). President Jiang's tirade not only surprised the media and 
politicians in the territory, but also became international news. 
Headlines of the reports on the Wang case by 
• Apple Daily: "Beijing official gruffly threatens media" ("Beijing official", 2000) 
• SCMP: "Media warned on Taiwan reports" (Ma & Political Desk, 2000) 
• Ming Pao: "Wang Fengchao puts limitation to Taiwan reports" ("Wang Fengchao", 
2000) 
Headlines of the reports on the Jiang case by 
• Apple Daily: "Jiang Zemin blows his top - a complete indelicacy" (Ching, 2000) 
• SCMP: "Jiang attacks 'naive' media" (Kong & Cheung, 2000) 
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• Ming Pao: "Support different from imperial order, says Jiang" (Leung, 2000). 
While the headlines by the SCMP and Ming Pao are not provocative, the ones 
by Apple Daily stand out as the bluntest and the most emotional among the three. They 
clearly reflect the paper's marked antipathy and opposition towards Wang's advice and 
Jiang's 'lecture'. A brief qualitative analysis oft he contents of these reports will further 
single out the uniqueness of Apple Daily from the other two papers. 
Analysis of reports on the Wang case 
Apple Daily began the report with rather strong statements: "The 'gunfire' from 
Beijing's cannonade pointing towards Taiwanese independence has finally spread to 
Hong Kong ... Wang Fengchao warned the Hong Kong media in a fiery manner ... " 
("Beijing official", 2000). Aside from employing strong words, the paper devoted 
about half of the article to reporting the opinions of several local press freedom 
defenders. While Ming Pao and the SCMP also ran reports on several free press 
advocates' responses towards the issue, the number of paragraphs they devoted was 
significantly less than in Apple Daily. Furthennore, the two dailies simply narrated the 
event in a factual manner, without highlighting the conflict. 
Analysis of reports on the Jiang case 
Among the three newspapers, Apple Daily had the most detailed report of the 
event, in which an overwhelmingly large part was composed of direct quotes from Jiang 
Zernin. To further emphasise Jiang's fierceness towards the SARjoumalists, the paper 
described his gestures and facial expressions with phrases that carry negative 
connotations, such as "blustered with grouchiness", "ranted af', "scowled at" and 
"spoke with increasing wrath". On the other hand, reports by Ming Pao and the SCMP 
were not as detailed, and terms with derogatory meanings were not found. 
Some may attribute the differences in the style of both the headlines and 
contents to fair and objective reporting as opposed to sensationalism in Apple Daily's 
case. However, the factor of owner's influence may not be ruled out when one looks at 
the history and changes of the three papers. 
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The changes in the SCMP newsroom, as mentioned above, are deemed as 
politically motivated moves aimed at toning down the paper's coverage on Chinese 
affairs. Many believe that Ming Pao has also been making changes for the same 
reasons. Being identified as Hong Kong's most influential n~wspaper, Ming Pao was a 
thorn in the side of the Beijing government. It was once classified as "hostile" by the 
Xinhua News Agency (China's de facto embassy in Hong Kong), due to its aggressive 
coverage of the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 (Kahn, 1997). Malaysian-Chinese 
timber and publishing magnate Tiong Hiew King purchased the daily in 1995, partly 
because of his "patriotic instincts" and his desire to "make contributions to the Chinese 
people" (Kahn, 1997). The word 'Chinese' is ambiguous, since no one can be sure if 
Tiong was referring to the Hong Kong Chinese or the mainland Chinese. However, 
several changes in Ming Pao following Tiong's takeover seem to indicate that his 
"contributions" are geared towards the mainland Chinese. 
Firstly, a senior opinion writer from Shanghai who once worked for a mainland 
government propaganda department joined the daily (Kahn, 1997). Secondly, the paper 
has begun following the style of mainland papers, referring to Taiwan as a province of 
China. Thirdly, coverage of dissent in the mainland has been significantly reduced, and 
stories on Chinese politics have been discouraged (Kahn, 1997). Ming Pao reporters 
noticed the editorial changes, and one of them said, "The editors feel more comfortable 
if we just wait for the official version to come out" (Kahn, 1997). Those who were 
disgruntled with the changes, simply left the paper. The daily's former political editor 
Lai Pui Yee, who was also a former chairperson of the HKJA, once commented that 
there were strange things going on at Ming Pao and she did not want to be part of it 
(Kahn, 1997). 
The envirornnent in Apple Daily is an entirely different story. It is not surprising, 
for the pro-democracy paper's owner Jimmy Lai Chi Ying is known as a solid defender 
of press freedom. His brashness was once compared to that of Allen H. Neuharth, the 
founder of USA TODAY and the Freedom Forum (Sandeen, 1998). According to Lai, 
his bold move of entering the highly competitive local newspaper market was 
encouraged by the increasing kowtowing stance of the media, which led to a drop in 
readership (Lai, 1996, p.256). He saw an opportunity for a new independent voice and 
therefore launched Apple Daily. Lai goes against the trend of self-censorship and 
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censorship, encouraging criticism even in the coverage of Chinese news (Steinberger, 
1996). 
Despite the fact that his Giordano clothing stores in China were forced to close 
down temporarily after his magazine Next published an article insulting the then 
Chinese Premier Li Peng (Steinberger, 1996), the flamboyant entrepreneur has never 
become submissive. Both the daily and the magazine have continued lambasting 
China's leadership as well as satirising the SAR government. However, there is one 
price that Jimmy Lai is still paying, which once again confirms the existence of Beijing 
interference. The reporters of both Apple Daily anc' the Next magazine have been 
refused official accreditation to go to the mainland to cover news. This is attributed to 
Beijing's carrot-and-stick tactics: while 'friendly' journalists will be invited for 
briefings and be granted speedy access to information, those 'unfriendly' ones will get 
blacklisted or even punished (HKJA & Article 19, 1997, p.53). 
Conclusion 
It is undeniable that the Chinese authorities had been attempting to intervene in 
the operation of the Hong Kong's media during the first four years after the handover. 
With both explicit and implicit methods, Beijing had exerted pressure on some media 
organisations, which gradually led to an erosion of the SAR's press freedom. Evidence 
of such influence can be cited in three major incidents occurrt:d in the year 2000, 
namely Wang Fengchao 's remarks, Jiang Zemin' s 'lecture' and Willy Lam's removal. 
A brief qualitative analysis of how these cases were covered by Apple Daily, 
South China Morning Post and Ming Pao suggests that self-censorship was neither a 
myth nor the greatest enemy to press freedom in Hong Kong. Censorship exercised by 
the editorial and management level also accounted for the toning down of certain local 
newspapers' coverage on China, with the economic interests of the papers' owners in 
the mainland being a main factor. 
While the existence of Beijing's interference is certain, the survival of pro-
democracy Apple Daily shows that press freedom in the SAR has no lack of sunshine. 
In fact, Apple Daily is not fighting alone. Chapter Two will introduce more defenders 
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of press freedom in the territory, so as to examine the result of the 'tug-of-war' in the 
first four years after the handover. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Looking on the Bright Side: Hong Kong's Resistance 
Chapter one paints a rather gloomy picture of press freedom in Hong Kong 
during the first four years after the handover. However, the identification of major 
incidents and the acknowledgement of the existence of both censorship and self-
censorship do not necessarily signal that this thesis takes a pessimistic stance towards 
the issue. As it.s title indicates, there has been a tug-of-war over the SAR's press 
freedom. The mainland's intimidation, which has been illustrated in the previous 
chapter, is only one side of the story. 
This chapter seeks to point out that there are people in Hong Kong who have 
constantly pulled the rope from the other side, fighting for the freedom of the press. 
Arguments will be based on responses from well-known press freedom advocates to the 
three controversial incidents which occurred in the year 2000: Wang Fengchao's 
remarks, President Jiang's 'lecture' and Willy Lam's removal. These prominent figures 
include pro-democracy legislators Martin Lee and Emily Lau, the former SAR Chief 
Secretary for Administration Anson Chan, as well as the Hong Kong Journalists 
Association. In addition, a qualitative analysis of the editorials on the first two cases by 
Apple Daily, Ming Pao and the South China Morning Post will be conducted, in order 
to articulate one argument: while different local newspapers might hold different 
political directions, all of them show no tolerance towards Beijing's verbal attacks. 
The Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA) 
Founded in 1968, the Hong Kong Journalists Association has emerged as an 
outspoken pressure group that dedicates its effort in defending press freedom and 
dealing with issues related to the journalism profession (Chan, Lee & Lee, 1996, p.32). 
It has been recognised by many foreign organisations as a "vocal and respectable force" 
in these aspects (Lau, 1998, p.30). This is no exaggeration when one looks at how the 
association responded to Wang Fengchao's warning to the SAR media regarding reports 
on Taiwan issues. 
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The HKJA refused to accept Wang's 'advice', for it believed that damage would 
be done to the media's independence and credibility (Hong Kong Journalists 
Association [HKJA] & Article 19,2000, p.6). It also strongly denounced the comments 
as a breach of China's promise to retain Hong Kong's administrative autonomy after the 
handover (HKJA & Article 19, p.6). To further express its antipathy against the 
remarks, the association wrote to Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, hoping that Zhu would 
help prevent any recurrences of similar 'advico' from Beijing ("The HKJA", 2000). In 
addition, it staged a 24-hour industry-wide signature campaign in order to convey "the 
opposition of Hong Kong journalists being asked to be tools to promulgate state 
policies", and to show their "commitment to editorial independence" ("The HKJA", 
2000). 
Regarding President Jiang's 'lecture', the association condemned any strong 
remarks from the central leadership like Jiang's, as they would put the media under 
direct pressure (HKJA & Article 19, 2001, p.9). While Jiang accused the SAR 
journalists of always asking simple and nai've questions, the HKJA chairperson Mak 
Yin Ting argued that the questions posed were "sensible and legitir.dte" (Ron, 2000). 
She went on to explain that whether Tung Chee Hwa was 'the emperor's choice for re-
election' was certainly related to the implementation of the 'one country, two systems' 
principle. The journalists simply represented the people of Hong Kong to express one 
oftheir main concerns (Ron, 2000). Furthermore, Mak suspected that Jiang deliberately 
overreacted in order to conceal his reluctance to clarify Beijing's stance on the re-
election ("It's their responsibility", 2000). 
The HKJA has been sensitive to China's attempts to intervene in the SAR media. 
It doubted that Lam's abrupt departure was due to an internal reshuffling of staff. 
Instead, the HKJA believed that "pressure from the outside" was involved, which aimed 
at making the South China Morning Post's China coverage more acceptable to the 
Beijing government (Wong, 2000a). Mak Yin Ting was worried that the Post's 
decision would signal an erosion of editorial freedom of Hong Kong's English-language 
newspapers, which would in tum affect the territory's international image (Wong, 
2000a). 
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The HKJA has put in an impressive amount of effort to safeguard press freedom 
in Hong Kong. It has not only showed overwhelming support for the local journalists 
with regard to attacks from Chinese officials, but also suggested ways and means in its 
annual reports as to what could be done to preserve freedom of expression in the 
territory. 
Martin Lee Chu Ming- Head of the Democratic Party in Hong Kong 
Martin Lee has been one ofthe most outspoken advocates of democracy in Hong 
Kong. He has always criticised China's human rights record as well as its communistic 
state policies which, in his opinion, would have adverse effects on the SAR. Viewed as 
a "subversive" by the Beijing government and as a "future martyr" by the territory, Lee 
sees himself as "a man of principle", who will "stand by what he believes is right for 
Hong Kong" (Lee, 1996, p.233). Undoubtedly, press freedom has been a fundamental 
element to the success of the territory in Lee's eyes. 
While Lee appreciates Beijing's promise of 'one·country, two systems', he has a 
constant fear of the mainland abandoning this principle which ensures Hongkongers' 
rights and freedoms. This was reflected in his views towards Wang Fengchao's remarks, 
which he saw as an infringement on the SAR media's freedoms, thus rendering it an 
empty promise ("Different responses", 2000). Lee encouraged SAR journalists to try 
their best to safeguard this principle (Ma & Political Desk, 2000), and condemned 
Wang for providing the media a classification of whom they can and cannot interview 
(Ma & Li, 2000). With reference to the belief that Wang Fengchao was voicing his 
displeasure over the television interview with Taiwan's pro·independence Vice-
president Annette Lu Hsiu Lien, Martin Lee expressed his antipathy in a satirical 
statement: "If Annette Lu Hsiu Lien is today's target, then the Democratic Party will be 
tomorrow's" ("Various responses", 2000). 
The pro-democracy legislator's response to President Jiang's 'lecture' was even 
blunter. He described Jiang's outburst as an act of "tainting Chinese people's honour" 
(Wong & Chan, 2000), for he dispraised the Hong Kong reporters in a foreigu language 
(English) and compared their professionalism with that of a veteran Caucasian journalist 
(Jiang eulogised American journalist Mike Wallace, who has had sixty years journalistic 
I 
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experience and interviewed Jiang for the CBS's 60 Minutes). Lee supported the SAR 
reporters, saying that they were asking the questions in good faith (Wong & Chan, 
2000). Other members of the Democratic Party added that Jiang's outbreak revealed 
Beijing's "subconscious" tightening of its control over Hong Kong ("April 5 Action", 
2000). 
Lee also expressed his concern over Willy Lam's removal. He revealed that he 
was a loyal reader of Willy Lam's, whose columns, according to Lee, had consistently 
provided "accurate information" ("Editorial independence", 2000). He was dissatisfied 
with the SCMP's decision, saying that the newspaper owed the public a justifiable 
explanation for this "suspicious" move ("Editorial independence", 2000). 
Given his intrepid and pro-democratic spirit, it is no surprise that Martin Lee and 
his colleagues from the Democratic Party have been refused any dialogue with the 
Chinese government (Lee, 1996, p.234). Lee once revealed his fear for his party as well 
as the local press being pressured under Chinese rule. Nevertheless, he confidently 
promised that the Party would "soldier on" and "continue to be the voice of Hong 
Kong" ("Hong Kong's Martin Lee", 1997). 
Emily Lau Wai Hing- Head of tbe Frontier 
Emily Lau has been no less enthusiastic than Martin Lee when it comes to 
fighting for press freedom. Being a former journalist and former chairperson of the 
HKJA, Lau fully understands the concerns of local reporters, and is renowned for her 
outspokenness. 
Lau was disgruntled with Wang Fengchao's Taiwan remarks, sa)'lng, "if 
mainland officials were to point a finger here and there, telling us what we should do 
and what we should not do, it would have a big impact on Hong Kong's press freedom" 
(Ma & Li, 2000). She added that the remarks had an implication of urging the media to 
exercise self-censorship ("Anger erupts", 2000). Together with other members of the 
Frontier (another pro-democracy party), Lau staged a demonstration outside the Central 
Government Offices, calling for the SAR government to defend press freedom ("Anger 
erupts", 2000). 
-'" - "'&' 
Chapter Two 26 
Also when it came to commenting on Chinese President Jiang Zomin, the 
legislator spoke without reserve. Lau said that Jiang's behaviour in the outbreak had 
not been "statesmanlike", suspecting that his original motivation was to "maintain the 
fake belief' that the SAR Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa was elected (Hon, 2000). 
She added that Jiang mishandled the situation and thus resulted in an "indelicate 
perfonnance" (Wong & Chan, 2000). 
As for Willy Lam's removal, Emily Lau believed that it was directly related to 
his skinnish with Robert Kuok in June 2000. She referred to the event as a "nail in [the] 
coffin" for both press freedom and the SCMP's credibility (Goff, n.d.). She openly 
criticised the daily's political inclination, claiming that the incident signalled a tendency 
to buck under criticism from "the rich and the powerful". 
Anson Cban-Fang On Sang - Former Cbief Secretary for Administration in Hong 
Kong 
Like Martin Lee and Emily Lau, Anson Chan is a democracy advocate. Before 
her retirement in April 2001, Chan won the popularity of most Hongkongers. She was 
honoured as 'Hong Kong's conscience' for her forthright manner in standing up for the 
interests of the community, campaigning for a wide range of rights and freedoms that 
the citizens have enjoyed. 
As a defender of freedom, Chan responded promptly and finnly to Wang 
Fengchao's remarks: "Press freedom is guaranteed by the Basic Law as are the 
freedoms of speech and publication", and therefore the Hong Kong media is "free to 
comment and report on all matters of current interest" in accordance to the SAR's mini-
constitution (Ma & Political Desk, 2000). She further pacified the anxiety caused by 
Wang's comments, saying the SAR government perfectly understood the importance of 
press freedom to an open and free society like Hong Kong. Chan promised that the 
government would work with the media and the whole community to protect their rights 
and freedoms ("Mrs Chan", 2000). 
Although the Chief Secretary did not make any specific comment on President 
Jiang's 'lecture' and Willy Lam's removal, she once again put great emphasis on press 
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freedom shortly after Lam's departure. In a conference on 'Press, Power & Politics: 
Asia' held by the Freedom Forum, Anson Chan pointed out that press freedom is a 
"bedrock guarantee" of Hongkongers' way of life, and is imbedded in their "hearts and 
minds" (Fiiess, 2000). She incisively asserted that a free press must be accepted "warts 
and all. You can't have a virtually free press or a more-or-less free press. That's like a 
little pregnant" (Fiiess, 2000). 
Occasional participants and foreign support 
The groups and individuals mentioned above are the more vocal and 'die-hard' 
defenders of press freedom. In fact, there are also participants who occasionally stand 
up for the territory's interests. For example, Wang Fengchao's remarks outraged many 
organisations, such as the Bar Association, human rights activists and university 
students. They reached a consensus that Wang's warning was unacceptable because a 
free press is "an inalienable right" ofHongkongers (Hon, Shiu & No, 2000). Moreover, 
student representatives from City University, Shue Y an College and the University of 
Hong Kong marched to the Liaison Office, protesting against Beijing's interference. 
They declared that the media would refuse to be the "government mouthpiece", and 
demanded a public apology from Wang ("University students", 2000). 
It is important to point out that the local press freedom defenders have also been 
gaining support from the international community. Since its return to China on 151 July 
1997, Hong Kong has been placed "under the international limelight", being monitored 
for China's implementation ofthe 'one country, two systems' formula (Liu, 1998, p.63). 
The local International Relations Sub-committee has been invited to give speeches in 
seminars held by many foreign organizations, such as the International Federation of 
Journalists and the Canadian Committee to Protect Journalists (Liu, 1998, p.64). 
According to the sub-committee, the support it receives has been enormous. Indeed, 
Britain and the United States entered the row over Wang Fengchao incident, saying that 
they were very concerned and shocked by the Chinese official's comments ("America 
shocked", 2000). 
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Analysis of newspapers' editorials 
No matter how stalwart these free press advocates are, their efforts would have 
been futile if the local news agencies themselves were not concerned or firm enough 
about the issue. Chapter One has shown the reader a worrying sign, whereby among 
three local newspapers Apple Daily, Ming Pao and the South China Morning Post, the 
first paper seemed to be the only one which is tough and critical on China regardless of 
Beijing's interference. As a matter of fact, this observation is only valid to the 
comparison of their report sections. The following qualitative analysis of the three 
dailies' editorials on Wang and Jiang incidents, seeks to emphasise that all of them see 
press freedom as a fundamental value. 
Apple Daily 
As mentioned in Chapter One, Apple Daily's owner Jimmy Lai has been a 
tenacious defender of press freedom. Despite the legal actions that China has taken 
against him, Lai continues publishing critical coverage of China. He even hired the 
dauntless columnist Chan Ya, whose series of articles criticising China was dropped by 
her former editor at Express Daily News which eventually led to the termination of her 
contract (Steinberger, 1996). Lai's persistence in standing by his principle "fight for 
freedom and democracy" is often reflected in the paper's editorials. 
Since the day after Wang Fengchao made his remarks, Apple Daily serialised its 
concern over the issue in its editorials on three consecutive days. The daily began the 
first editorial with strong comments that reflected its disapproval of Wang's advice: "It 
will not only curtail the media's editorial independence as well as press freedom, but 
will also tum 'one country, two systems' into an empty promise. Thus, both the SAR's 
media and citizens should say 'no' to Beijing's advice" (Lo, 2000a). In the latter part of 
the editorial, the paper modestly requested the Beijing government to understand the 
belief that "accurate and objective reporting is beneficial to everyone" (Lo, 2000a). 
The second editorial was written from a historical perspective, where Apple 
Daily commented that Wang's remarks simply reflected the Beijing government's 
persistence in cracking down on dissent against official state policies, many of which 
had resulted in catastrophic mistakes (Lo, 2000b). The paper cited as one of the 
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examples - the 'Great Leap Forward' launched by the CCP government in the 1950s, 
where rice fields were ploughed to make way for steel foundries and tractor factories in 
order to push ahead in China's drive to industrialization. As a result, millions were 
starved to death due to a sharp decrease in the supply of food, and the situation was 
further confounded by natural disasters. The aim of the editorial was to emphasise that 
the freedom to publish objective and accurate reporting of different voices is 
fundamental to reducing any country's chances of making such mistakes (Lo, 2000b). 
Apple Daily wrote the third editorial in response to the Local National People's 
Congress deputies Ng Hong Mun and Wu Wai Yung's accusation that the SAR media 
had been overreacting to Wang Fengchao's remarks. They shared the same view that 
the remarks were not a promulgation of a piece of law, but "advice out of good 
intentions for the media" (Kong, 2000). The paper contended that the media responded 
pertinently and "there was no way they should have kept quiet" (Lo, 2000c). It 
perceived Wang's comments as a clear threat to the territory's press freedom, which 
would turn the media into a machine for government propaganda. According to Apple 
Daily, the comments also defied the Hong Kong media's perception of 'social 
responsibility', which is to provide their readers with different kinds of opinion so as to 
enable them to make informed judgments (Lo, 2000c). 
As compared to its strong response to Wang Fengchao's remarks, Apple Daily 
seemed more moderate towards President Jiang's 'lecture'. While one may accuse 
Apple Daily of being afraid of taking on Jiang, the fact is that Wang Fengchao had 
issued a 'warning' to the Hong Kong media, whereas President Jiang was merely 
criticising the professionalism of the SAR journalists. In its editorial, Apple Daily 
commended Jiang's ability of previously handling such questions with ease, which he 
had shown before (Lo, 2000d). The paper presumed that Jiang's uncharacteristic 
outbreak was due to the extreme sensitiveness of the 'one country, two systems' 
principle to both Beijing and Hong Kong. It suggested that Jiang's anger was 
understandable in the sense that the question of 'the SAR leader being appointed by 
Beijing' would have a negative impact on international confidence in the 'one country, 
two systems' principle. Nevertheless, Apple Daily asserted that this was one of the 
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main concerns in the SAR and the question was therefore valid. In the paper's opinion, 
the SARjournalists posed a fair question, but Jiang did not answer in a thoughtful way. 
These editorials clearly show Apple Daily's political stance: pro-democracy but 
not anti-China. However, China does not seem to understand the fact that there is not 
necessarily any conflict between the two positions. This topic will be further explored 
in Chapter Four. 
MingPao 
While Ming Pao's reports seem to be more 'fair' and 'objective' as compared to 
that of Apple Daily, the paper is capable of being quite critical in its editorials when it 
comes to standing up for its beliefs. 
Ming Pao likened Wang Fengchao's remarks to a "depth bomb thrown at the 
Hong Kong press" ("Beijing must not", 2000). It pointed out that such advice not only 
infringed upon the territory's freedom of the press, but also went against 'one country, 
two systems', Beijing's pledge to the SAR. The paper suggested some negative 
consequences that might occur if China was to go back on its words, such as a drop in 
both local and international confidence in the promise, and Hong Kong being a less 
convincing model for Taiwan in China's hopes of reunification. 
The daily showed its emphasis on the promise of 'one country, two systems' 
again in its editorial on President Jiang's 'lecture'. Ming Pao asserted that the question 
of whether the SAR Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa was a Beijing appointee for the 
re-election had been asked so many times for good reasons. If it were so, it would 
reflect on "how strictly" the Chinese government would adhere to the pledge ("We wiiJ 
ask", 2000). In addition, the paper demanded a clear explanation from Jiang of his 
equivocal statement "supporting Tung's second tenn but not issuing any imperial 
decree". 
Lo (1998) suggests that Ming Pao's editorials "appear to tilt toward Beijing". 
However, the above two do not seem compatible with his observation. 
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South China Morning Post 
Many believe that the South China Morning Post has adopted a policy of self-
censorship or censorship in its coverage due to its proprietor's business connections. 
Indeed, the daily seldom explicitly criticises Chinese leaders even in its editorials. 
However, its support for press freedom has been subtly presented. 
Unlike Apple Daily and Ming Pao, the SCMP did not show any strong 
opposition to Wang Fengchao's remarks. Rather, it conservatively commented that his 
remarks had "everything to do with press freedom", and would be an obstacle for Hong 
Kong to create a knowledge-based economy ("Dangerous policy", 2000). The paper 
also suggested that it is important to protect press freedom if Hong Kong "is ever to 
become a world class city along the lines of New York and London" ("Dangerous 
policy", 2000). Furthermore, the Post emphasised that accurate reporting and 
advocating are fundamentally different. In so doing, the daily identified itself as a 
responsible medium, where it has presented information from both sides in order for 
readers to make an informed decision. 
Similarly, the SCMP seemed to keep a relatively neutral stance on the President 
Jiang issue. It attributed Jiang's unprecedented outbreak to his Jack of acclimatisation 
to the SAR's inquisitive media, who are vastly different from their deferential 
counterparts in the mainland ("Press and president", 2000). Meanwhile, the daily 
defended the professionalism of Hong Kong journalists, saying that the simple 
questions asked were not necessarily wrong. It pointed out that due to their highly 
restricted access to Chinese leaders, it is normal for the SAR reporters to pose as many 
questions as they can when the opportunity arises. The Post concluded the editorial 
with the statement: "The more remote the leadership, the more frantic the scramble from 
the media to know their minds" ("Press and president", 2000). 
While the Post's editorials seem fairly tame as compared to Apple Daily's, they 
reflect the paper's concern over the situation of press freedom in Hong Kong, as well as 
its values of justice in an implicit way. 
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Conclusion 
In contrast to Chapter One, this chapter has presented a more optimistic view of 
press freedom in Hong Kong. Firstly, the territory's significant resistance to serious 
infringements from Chin~ in the year 2000 was shown. The persistence of some of the 
prominent free press advocates certainly played a major part in the fight, but the efforts 
of the occasional participants and support from the international community should not 
be neglected. 
Secondly, the South China Morning Post and Ming Pao were shown no less 
tolerant than the pro-democracy Apple Daily when it came to the verbal attacks from 
Beijing. Despite their see1ningly toned-down China cove;·age, the former two dailies 
did comment critically on both Wang Fengchao's remarks and President Jiang's 
'lecturo'. in their editorials. The words they employed reflected ('clearly' in Ming Pao's 
case and 'subtly' in the SCMP's case) their strong support for press freedom. 
On the whole, the ensuing 'tug-of-war' in the first four years after the handover 
seemed to be in Beijing's favour in the light of the removal of Willy Lam and his 
subsequent departure. Negative consequences might result if Beijing became the final 
winner ofthe battle, and this will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Importance of Preserving Press Freedom in Hong Kong: 
A Social, Political and Economic Perspective 
As can be seen in Chapter One and Chapter Two, Beijing's interference in the 
SAR media can sometimes be quite heavy-handed, and anyone who champions press 
freedom (or democracy in general) is basically consioered a subversive. Some may 
wonder why stalwarts like Martin Lee and Emily Lau still soldier on so confidently and 
intrepidly. The reason could be as simple as this - Hong Kong cannot afford to lose its 
freedom ofthe press. 
This chapter examines the importance of preserving press freedom in Hong 
Kong from three perspectives: social, political and economic. It will explore the topic 
by working on the hypothetical assumption that press freedom was taken away from the 
SAR. It will predict the negative impacts that might result, and supportive arguments 
for these hypotheses will be based on the study of cultural, social and political history of 
the territory. In addition, it will discuss the significance of a /aissez-faire media 
environment to maintaining Hong Kong's economic success. 
In microcosm: Press freedom and the Hong Kong journalistic circle 
The loss of press freedom in Hong Kong will certain! y have the most direct 
impacts on the local newsroom, and hence the journalism profession. Studies by Chan, 
Lee and Lee (1996, p.33) on Hong Kong journalists during the transition period of the 
handover revealed that half of the respondents held a bleak view of the future of press 
freedom under Chinese rule. Many of them doubted the feasibility of the 'one country, 
two systems' scheme, and expressed uncertainty over their career prospects. The 
emergence of self-censorship and censorship, which has resulted from Beijing's 
interference in the media, has already caused some of the top local journalists to quit 
their jobs. Willy Lann Wo Lap's resignation from the South China Morning Post is a 
more recent and well-publicised example. Another two highly respected editors Daisy 
Li Yuet Wah and Carol Lai Pui Yee left their jobs at Ming Pao even before the 
handover, as they noticed the link between ·editorial changes and press owners' business 
interests on the mainland (Neumann, 1997). Thus, it can be assumed •hat a complete 
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curtailment of press freedom would frustrate the apprehensive journalists and further 
shake their confidence in staying with the local press. 
Willy Lam, Daisy Li and Carol Lai can be regarded as journalists with ideals, 
who quit their jobs but remain active in the journalistic circle. However, there are 
additional factors that have been encouraging local reporters to leave the profession, the 
most major being that journalism has never been well. paying in the territory. The Hong 
Kong Journalists Association (HKJA) noticed this problem over ten years ago, pointing 
out that the average minimum wage for a reporter at a Chinese newspaper was just 
slightly higher than that of a Filipino maid (Mosher, 1988, p.29). Moreover, there exists 
a different pay scale in certain bilingual news agencies, where Chinese-language 
reporters are paid less than their English-language counterparts (Mosher, p.29). Chan, 
Lee and Lee (1996, p.70) draw a more contrasting comparison, saying that the salary of 
university graduates working for news media is usually one-third less than their fellow 
graduates in other professions that require equally high qualifications. These factors 
explain why many young people see journalism as a stepping-stone, where they can 
gain experience before hunting for more lucrative jobs in other fields such as public 
relations (Chan, et a!., p.43). Switching from one field to another is no problem for 
them, since most of the new reporters are degree holders, with good command of both 
Chinese and English (Chan, et a!., p.29). 
What also plays a part in accounting for the brain drain phenomenon in the Hong 
Kong journalistic circle is emigration. Since Hong Kong's reversion to China was made 
certain in 1980s, many locals have started emigrating to secure their future after 1997. 
The outflow rate peaked after June 4, 1989, when thousands of mainland Chinese 
demonstrators who had been ca11ing for democratic reforms at the Tiananmen Square in 
Beijing for days, were eventually cracked down upon and killed by China's military 
forces. The journalism profession has been affected, with a number of reporters either 
having applied or desiring to apply for emigration (Chan, et a!., p.37). Some American 
congressmen expressed concern over press freedom in the territory, and "tried to 
introduce a bill to protect the Hong Kong journalists by allowing them to emigrate to 
the United States" (Lo, 1998). The 'assistance' from America would simply aggravate 
the brain drain. 
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Those who have no intention of leaving would also need to worry about whether 
they would remain employed for long. Thus, they may choose to adopt self-censorship 
in order to survive. That being said, the possibility of doing a good job with the absence 
of freedom and independence is imaginably low. The unsatisfactory working conditions 
(low pay and lack of autonomy) would also discourage fresh graduates from considering 
journalism as a career option. Journalistic standards would drop if under-qualified 
people who have no relevant background knowledge had to be relied upon as reporters. 
With a lack of talent in the profession foliowed by a decline in quality, Hong Kong's 
vibrant press scene would severely shrink. 
It is important to point out that not all journalists who stayed behind are willing 
to compromise. A survey by Chan, Lee and Lee (1996, p.117) has revealed that an 
overwhelming percentage of the respondents agreed that "the media should fight to 
maximize Hong Kong's autonomy'', under which press freedom could flourish. There 
is likely to be social and political disorder if China decided to infringe on the SAR's 
freedom of the press and other individual rights. This will be discussed at length in the 
next section. 
In macrocosm: Press freedom and the SAR citizens 
To predict how the whole community would be affected by the disappearance of 
press freedom, it is necessary to mention the Basic. Law, the mini-constitution of the 
SAR in which press freedom is enshrined. Chapter Three, Article 27 of the Basic Law 
states that "Hong Kong residents shall have freedom of speech, of the press and of 
publication" (Committee on the Promotion of Civic Education, 1999, p.l 08). Article 39 
further assures these freedoms by promising to comply with the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (p.l 09). Taking the fact that press freedom is recognised 
as a fundamental civil right for local residents, the curtailment of this particular freedom 
would mean that China is in the position to reduce other rights currently enshrined in 
the Basic Law, such as the freedom of association, the right to strike and fonn unions. 
This would outrage a majority of the SAR citizens due to their political attitudes, beliefs 
and way oflife. 
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Hong Kong people are nowadays generally considered as "outspoken" and 
"being able to react promptly and cleverly" (Ma & Fung, 1999, p.507). This is vastly 
different from the impression of them prior to late 1980s, when they were observed 
apathetic and inactive towards politics (McMillen, 1993, p.3). This view was 
demolished after the occurrence of the Tiananmen Square massacre, which brought 
about profound effects on the territory both socially and politically. On one hand, 
Hongkongers' confidence in China's ability to keep its words was badly shaken. Those 
who were terrified of what might come next chose to emigrate, of which the majority 
was middle-class professionals. On the other hand, it began their political awakening 
and unity, with a million of them took to the streets and called for speedier 
democratisation in both China and Hong Kong (McMillen, p.5). It also sparked off the 
formation of various formal political parties, with the United Democrats of Hong Kong 
(the UDHK, now the Democratic Party) being the pioneer. 
The Hong Kong people's political inclinations have been made clear during the 
direct elections to the Legislative Council in 1991 and 1995, where the Democratic 
Party and its former body the UDHK won an overwhelming number of seats (Lee, 1996, 
p.241). Their support for democratisation was also reflected in the "unusually high 
popularity" enjoyed by Hong Kong's last governor Christopher Patten (Blyth & 
Wotherspoon, 1996, p.277), who introduced a reform package to accelerate the 
development of democracy in the territory and therefore became a thorn in Chi11a's side. 
In addition, Hongkongers started to express their concerns over their interests in a more 
explicit and vocal way. Public protests and demonstrations have become common 
occurrences in the territory since the June 4 (Tiananmen) events. As pro-democracy 
legislator Mart.in Lee (Lee, 1996, p.243) points out, those who chose to stay in the 
territory are likely to have developed the "people in the same boat" mentality, whereby 
even ordinary citizens would be willing to "do a little bit more to preserve their own 
liberties". In particular, local citizens expect the Hong Kong government to be "tolerant 
of different and opposing views" (Lo, 1998) as an effect of the Tiananmen Square 
incident. Evidence can be cited in the outrage triggered by a Chinese diplomat in 
France who warned a Hong Kong journalist not pose any sensitive questions to visiting 
Chinese premier Zhu Rongji in April 1998 (U.S. Department of State, 1999). A more 
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recent example is the outrage resulting from Chinese official Wang Fengchao's warning 
to the SAR media regarding Taiwan reports in April2001. 
If verbal attacks could cause community-wide protests, it is imaginable that 
social and political upheavals would result if the CCP was to take direct actions against 
the SAR. McMillen (1993, p.9) observes that Hong Kong people have developed "a 
sense of bitterness and betrayal as well as a loss of trust" in the Chinese authorities. 
Surveys have also revealed that they "are prepared to defend social stability almost at 
any cost" (Chan & Lee, 1999, p.72). Furthermore, Hongkongers can be people of 
extremes in the sense that they would go to great lengths to put a point across. For 
example, in March 2001, a local citizen set himself on fire in front of the Supreme Court 
as a way of protesting against a proposed government regulation. This case was 
followed by another person who seriously injured himself at the headquarters of the 
Social Welfare Department, because he thought he did not get enough welfare benefits 
from the government. Although these cases only relate to two individuals out of the 
population of seven million, a huge uproar will most definitely result when it comes to a 
tangible threat that affects everyone. 
The worst and the most extreme scenario would be that of the Hong Kong 
people emulating Taiwan by breaking away from the mainland, perhaps even declaring 
independence. This would put the territory in jeopardy because history has shown that 
China values national stability above all (Ting, 1993, p.258), as can be seen in the June 
4 events. Hongkongers' calls for greater social and political freedoms in both the 
mainland and the territory were already seen as attempts to subvert the Chinese 
government (Ting, p.265). If Hong Kong were to commit acts detrimental to China's 
national stability or even its position of power, the Chinese government would most 
likely declare a state of martial law in the territory and deploy troops to quell civil 
unrest. It is noteworthy that the People's Liberation Army (the PLA, China's armed 
forces) has been statiomd in the territory for the purpose of "defence" since the 
handover (Committee on the Promotion of Civic Education, 1999, p.IOS). While the 
PLA will not intervene in the territory's internal affairs according to the Basic Law, 
Beijing could easily violate the law in the name of securing national stability and unity. 
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Since the SAR does not have its own military forces like Taiwan does, it might result in 
a situation worse than that of the Tiananmen Square incident. 
Significance of press freedom to Hong Kong as a major financial marketplace 
Hong Kong economist Y. C. Yao believes that the Hong Kong financial markets 
have thrived under the stable political climate as well as the legal system that Britain 
provided (Wang, 1994, p.l93). Combining this fact and the assumption that 
Hongkongers would create a major uproar if press freedom and other civil liberties were 
taken away, it is imaginable that the territory's economy would no doubt be seriously 
affected. Massive protests or worse would mean that the stable political climate that the 
city has enjoyed will be adversely affected; the disappearance of freedoms and rights 
guaranteed in the Basic Law would also imply that the constitution is being violated. 
Hong Kong's current economic system, which is a capitalist system adopted 
under British rule, is also enshrined in the Basic Law. Chapter I, Article 5 states that 
the SAR's previous social and economic systems will remain unchanged for 50 years 
after the handover (Committee on the Promotion of Civic Education, 1999, p.l03). The 
free market economy, together with a strategic location and ease of tnmsport, has made 
Hong Kong an ideal place for many international corporations to run their Asian 
operations (Wang, 1994, p.l93). However, what plays a more vital role is freedom of 
the press. According to Neumarm (1997), there exists an "inextricable relationship 
between the free flow of information and the strength of financial markets". This means 
that rapid exchange of accurate and uncensored economic information is necessary for 
the smooth functioning of the regional economy. The Hong Kong government's hands-
off attitude towards the press makes this possible, hence a climate of free expression is 
created. Foreign investors have come to rely on the continual supply of information by 
the local press, in order to understand the financial changes that are undetway in the 
region (Neumann, 1997). 
In addition to trust and confidence from foreign investors, the free flow of 
information and the free market economy has also earned Hong Kong memberships in a 
variety of international and regional organisations, such as the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation forum (APEC), the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) and 
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its successor, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Yahuda, 1997, p.209). If the 
Chinese government were to violate the Basic Law and impose its socialist policies on 
the SAR, official corruption that is pervasive in the mainland might start to proliferate 
in the territory with disastrous effects. As YahuC:a (1997, p.211) predicts, international 
corporations will have to reassess the value of Hong Kong if it is infected by corrupt 
practices. This might result in a scaling down of these companies' presence in the 
territory or even total departure. Considering the fact that an unfavourable human rights 
record had given China a hard time in gaining entry to the WTO, it would also be 
difficult for Hong Kong to regain its status if damage v.as done to its international 
image as well as confidence. 
Press freedom and the implications of China's economic liberalisation on Hong 
Kong's economy 
There is another way to examine the implications of China's WTO accession on 
the relationship between Hong Kong's press freedom and its economy. Hong Kong and 
China have long been each other's largest trading partner. The territory is often seen as 
the mainland's gateway to and from the rest of the world, for it serves as the main 
channel for China's imports, exports and re-exports (Hong Kong Trade Department 
Council, 2001). China also has substantial business interests in Hong Kong, with 
diversified investment like banking and property development (Hong Kong Economic 
& Trade Office (Canada), 2001). 
However, this cosy and reciprocal economic relationship may undergo changes 
that would be to Hong Kong's disadvantage. Bowring (1997, p.22) suggests that 
international companies based in Hong Kong that have business and investments in 
China now "feel the need to expand their presence in the mainland". Moreover, China's 
main commercial city Shanghai has been enhancing its attractiveness by improving its 
infrastructure and transportation, as well as the living and working conditions for 
foreign expatriates (Bowring, 1997, p.22). Besides, the WTO membership will speed 
up economic restructuring, promoting China's direct foreign investments as well as 
imports and exports (Global Resources, 2001). As a result, the significance of the 
territory's role of functioning as the intermediary for capital flows into China will be 
largely reduced. Therefore, a free press that provides accurate economic information, in 
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addition to a well-established legal system that discourages corruption and protects 
press freedom and other individual rights seems to be the only safeguard to sustain the 
competitive edge of Hong Kong's economy. 
Significance of press freedom to Hong Kong as a regional media centre 
The Joss of press freedom would not only endanger Hong Kong's status as a 
major financial marketplace, but also its status as a regional media centre. By virtue of 
the reasons mentioned above, the territory has attracted a vast network of both regional 
and international news organisations for many years. An additional factor is that 
journalists are not required to have licenses or special visas in order to operate in Hong 
Kong like they do in many other countries in Asia (Neumann, 1997). The city is 
currently a South East Asian base for many international newsgathering agencies like 
Associated Press; it is also a base for regional and international publications such as the 
Far Eastern Economic Review and the Asian Wall Street Journal (Infonnation Services 
Department, 2002). 
Singapore has long been a major competitor of Hong Kong for being a regional 
communications hub in East Asia. With equally modem infrastructure and advanced 
communication technologies, a free press is a crucial element that gives the territory an 
advantage over Singapore and makes the foreign newsgathering agencies stay (Bowring, 
1997, p.23). However, with Hong Kong's reversion to China and a potential restriction 
on press freedom, bureau chiefs of these organisations have been looking at alternative 
locations (Wrout, 1997, p.164). Being aware of these concerno, Singapore's Senior 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew had been in Hong Kong promoting his country as an alternative 
regional media hub (Wrout, 1997, 164). Lee has pointerl out in an interview that <he 
SAR is less "organised" than Singapore, and is less flexible due to its currency link with 
the U.S. dollar ("Singapore's Lee", 1999). In fact, the substantially lower rental costs 
also rilake Singapore more attractive than the SAR once the issue of press freedom is 
put aside. If the SAR were to lose its comparative advantage, these organisations would 
move without hesitation. It is noteworthy that international news agency Reuters, which 
was once based in Hong Kong, has already relocated to Singapore. 
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The Hong Kong press as a reliable source on China news for overseas Chinese 
Aside from attracting regional and foreign new agencies, press freedom helps 
the Hong Kong press win the hearts of both local and overseas Chinese readers. The 
wide range of political opinions available in the vibrant local press enables Hong Kong 
to enjoy profits from both the domestic and international markets. Many locals are 
observed to have a strong need for information, approximately 797,000 of them reading 
at least two newspapers a day (Mcintyre, 1998, p.36). However, as Chan (1997, p.231) 
points out, Hong Kong's domestic market is too small to sustain an economy of scale 
with the population of about seven million. Its smallness is actually compensated by an 
international market, where media products made in Hong Kong are consumed by 
readers from the Chinese diaspora in many countries. In particular, the Hong Kong 
press has become an important channel in spreading news on China around the world. 
In contrast to the strict control of the mainland media by the Beijing govemmcat, the 
Iocallaissez-faire media environment with virtually no restrictions allows credible and 
accurate infonnation to be published without being heavily censored. 
Apart from the free flow of information, the territory's geographical proximity 
to China enables fast and easy assess to information about the mainland (Chan & To, 
1999, p.486). Furthermore, the Hong Kong journalists have an advantage over their 
Western and Asian counterparts by virtue of their "extensive Chinese connections", as 
well as "good knowledge in the Chinese language and culture" (Chan & To, p.486). All 
of these factors explain why the local Chinese-language press has served as a trusted 
source on China news for overseas Chinese. If press freedom were restrained, Hong 
Kong would no longer be a "safe haven" for professional and independent Chinese-
language reporting on Chinese affairs (Neumann, 1997). Hence, Chinese from all over 
the world would only get to read what the mainland wants the world to know about 
China. 
Conclusion 
Given the unsatisfactory conditions and uncertain future of the Hong Kong 
journalistic circle, press freedom is an important instrument to soothe the local 
reporters' anxiety towards their career prospects. It helps maintain the SAR's vibrant 
press scene by preventing a drop in journalistic standards caused by the loss of good 
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reporters. Looking at a larger scale, the respect and preservation of press freedom and 
other civil rights would help stem the brain drain phenomenon and regain Hongkongers' 
confidence in both the Chinese and the SAR's authorities. It would also aid preserving 
social and political stability in the SAR. 
From the economic point of view, freedom of the press is necessary to attract 
foreign business corporations and news agencies to operate in Hong Kong, especially 
when the territory is facing constant and increasing competition from Singapore and 
China respectively. With the lack of a climate of freedom in these two countries, the 
SAR press' ability of providing accurate and uncensored economic infonnation is a 
safeguard to sustain the territory's robust economy. 
Simply understanding the importance of keeping press freedom in Hong Kong 
would not be effective enough to put an end to the 'tug-of-war'. Chapter Four will 
show how China and the SAR can reach a compromise on press freedom by discussing 
what they need to understand about each other. 
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The discussion in Chapter Three has created the impression that China is in the 
wrong in trying to curb Hong Kong's press freedom, which is essential for the SAR's 
survival. However, Hong Kong is no innocent victim either and is also responsible for 
the ongoing 'tug-of-war' due to its insufficient understanding of China. 
This chapter stresses that in order for China and Hong Kong to reach a 
compromise on press freedom, it is necessary ,.. ·r the two to develop a better 
understanding of each other as well as themselves. It will elaborate on the fundamental 
political beliefs and ideologies adopted by China and the SAR. It will also discuss their 
different interpretations of important tenns as well as their respective media's 
perception of social responsibility. In addition, the recent development of liberalisation 
in China will be mentioned, in order for Hong Kong to rethink its negative impression 
of its motherland. 
What Hong Kong needs to understand: Reasons for China's rejection of western 
liberal concepts 
While Hong Kong and the West are not wrong in sharing their message of 
freedom and democracy with China and other authoritarian regimes, it is necessary to 
understand that western values such as respect for human rights and the free market 
economy are not universal and applicable to every country. Chapter Three has pointed 
out that political stability, the legal system and the climate of freedom provided by 
Britain were key elements that made Hong Kong a major regional financial and media 
centre, as well as a trusted source on China news. Thus, the territory appears to be a 
good example to support the western idea that economic progress is dependent on 
democracy (Human Rights Internet, 2000). However, the breakdown ofthe Soviet bloc 
had shown that this formula for success is open to debate. Former Soviet Union leader 
Gorbachev adopted the policies of glanost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) for 
domestic reform (Ting, 1993, p.250). His liberation of civil society and nationalism 
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created the impetus that not only caused an economic decline, but also the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union itself(Ting, p.251). 
However, being an authoritarian regime as well, China's economic status tells a 
different story. China's economic growth has been consistently dominating Asia for a 
number of years, whereas other places in the region have been affected by the 1997 
Asian financial crisis and the recent global economic slowdown (Asia Pacific 
Management Forum, 2002). Being aware of its own economic success and the failure 
of the Soviet Union, it is no surprise that China holds sceptical views towards the "new 
international climate", where formerly authoritarian countries like South Africa and 
Nepal started to followed the 'three-D's' - democratisation, de-ideologisation and 
development (Ting, 1993, p.251). While retaining its favouritism towards socialism and 
its scepticism towards western capitalism, China's position on the conflict between the 
two polar systems is rather neutral. It believes that "mutual interaction and absorption 
can promote progress in human civilisation", but no country should impose their social 
systems and ways oflife on others (Ting, p.252). 
What Hong Kong and the West have been urging China to adopt is not only the 
capitalist economic system, but also the western definition of the term 'human rights'. 
As part of the western ideal of democracy, human rights are regarded as a set of natural 
rights that is higher than any statute law (Morikawa, n.d.). However, many seem to 
overlook the fact that China is not a democracy. As indicated by its name, the People's 
Republic of China is fundamentally a republic. A republic is defined as a state in which 
"all segments of society are enfranchised and in which a state's power is 
constitutionally limited" (Encyclopedia.com, 2002). In other words, both the citizens 
and their elected representatives are subject to law. Thus, instead of 'human rights', 
China describes the rights enjoyed by its people as "citizen's rights", which are subject 
to the law provided by the constitution (Morikawa, n.d.). Chinese President Jiang 
Zemin has also made clear that "there is no absolute freedom above the law" (Fong, 
1996). This explains why there is seemingly no freedom in China although there are 
various kinds of freedom guaranteed in the Constitution of the People's Republic of 
Cilina (1994), such as freedom of speech, of the press, of demonstration and of religious 
belief (p.29-30). 
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Aside from economic reasons and the political nature of China, there is another 
factor which accounts for the mainland's refusal to heed the calls for speedier 
democratisation and adoption of western concepts. George (2000, p.52), a commentator 
on Singaporean politics, points out that the reason why Singapore refuses to adopt the 
Westem liberal ideologies is because there exists a "shameful memory of white 
imperialism, military intervention and economic exploitation" in its people's minds. 
Unlike Singapore, which was formerly a colony of Britain, China was not colonised by 
any one nation. However, its numerous defeats at the hands of western powers in the 
1840s rendered it a virtually landlocked country when the foreign victors demanded 
treaty ports. The return of Hong Kong from the British and that of Macau from the 
Portuguese marked the end of colonialism in China, and more importantly, the 
restoration of Chinese national pride. Thus, if Singaporeans hold a "deep suspicion and 
sensitivity towards the slightest hint of post-colonial condescension" (George, p.52), it 
can be assumed that the mainland Chinese share the same mentality. Indeed, China 
explicitly expresses its antipathy against colonialism in the preamble of its constitution 
by stating that it consistently "supports the oppressed nations and the developing 
countries in their just struggle to win and preserve national independence" (Constitution 
of the People's Republic of China, 1994, p.6). 
What China needs to understand: 'Pro-democracy' differs from 'anti-China' 
The Hong Kong people do not seem to show the marked resistance and 
disgruntlement towards colonialism and western liberalism, unlike those in China and 
Singapore do. It is partly due to the territory's economic success, political stability as 
well as modernisation under British rule. A study has revealed that Hong Kong's living 
standards, economic development and the political system are what many locals base 
their claims of Hong Kong identity on (Thomas, 1999, p.87). Nevertheless, it is 
important to make clear that being western-minded and pro-democracy does not 
translate into anti-China feelings. This can be explained by the formation of 'Hong 
Kong identity'. 
Instead of being anti-China, it is more appropriate to say that Hong Kong is 
inherently opposed to communism. By the late 1940s, the people of Hong Kong were 
largely made up of refugees from China, who were escaping from the communist 
regime's rigid socio-political doctrine (Thomas, 1999, p.79). Local democrat Martin 
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Lee, whose father came as a refugee, points out that freedom wa"l what brought this first 
generation to the territory (Callick, 1998, p.141). With their cultural roots linked to the 
mainland and the absorption of western values from the eo Ionia! rule, they developed a 
distinctive Hong Kong way of life over time (Ma & Fung, 1999, p.499). For the 
subsequent generations who were locally born in the territory, and made up over 
seventy percent of the population by the 1990s, Hong Kong is the only place they 
identify themselves with (Thomas, p.83). Although being committed to Chinese culture, 
everyday experiences and a process of social and political changes have further tied 
these generations to the territory as well its local culture (Thomas, p.83). Hence, they 
have become more concerned with local public affairs and more assertive about their 
rights and interests (Chan & Lee, 1999, p.69). 
Having been ruled by the British for over 150 years, Hongkongers' interests are 
inevitably western-influenced. They tend to see the liberal concepts imported from 
Britain such as individual rights and freedoms as fundamental values. While many 
locals are proud of the Hong Kong identity, the Chinese authorities have perceived it as 
"a token of colonial power and a historical insult" (Ma & Fung, 1999, p.499). They 
seem to translate the Hongkongers' pro-democracy spirit into an anti-nationalistic 
sentiment. Despite China's implicit disapproval of the territory's social and political 
systems, which are vastly different from those of China, the two places had worked on 
the principle of 'well water does not mix with river water' - a Chinese idiom meaning 
not to interfere in each other's affairs (McMillen, 1993, p.20). Hong Kong was seen by 
China as having broken this unwritten rule, when a large number of its citizens took to 
the streets, protesting against the Chinese government's crackdown on the pro-
democracy movement at Tiananmen Square in Beijing in 1989. 
In terms of the 'well water' principle, the Hongkongers' calls for 
democratisation and greater freedoms in China after the Tiananmen crackdown could be 
considered as interference with China's internal affairs. However, they did so due to 
several reasons, but had no intention of overthrowing the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP). According to Thomas (1999, p.207), anger erupted over China's brutal actions 
because the people in the territory sympathised the demonstrators, who "based their 
ideological position in the liberal-democratic school of thought" like they did. More 
importantly, it held significant implications for Hong Kong's future after the handover. 
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Due to the fact that rights and freedoms have become part of the Hong Kong way of life, 
the local citizens have expressed their desire for democracy and have protested against 
China's intervention in the territory more frequently and in a more explicit way since 
the Tiananmen incident. This turns into a misunderstanding when the Chinese leaders 
interpret all these demonstrations as acts of anti-nationalism. They view the territory as 
a base for subversive activities, and in particular frown on the vocal Democratic Party. 
As a matter of fact, the Democratic Party as well as the westemised and pro-
democracy Hong Kong people have never styled themselves as an alternate government 
(Thomas, 1999, p.210). Ma & Fung's (1999, p.519) survey on Hongkongers' attitudes 
towards the handover has revealed that 75 percent of the respondents generally agreed 
that Hong Kong is part of China, and therefore were very positive about the 
reunification with socialist China. Unlike the Chinese government, they do not see the 
return of sovereignty and safeguarding the autonomy of the territory as opposites to 
each other (Ma & Fung, p.517). While Hongkongers admit that they might not be as 
patriotic as their mainland comrades (Ma & Fung, p.508), they certainly are not anti-
China. The fact that they have been trying to share the message of democracy with 
China suggests that they want China to be just as modernised and sophisticated as the 
territory. They nm on the assumption that what is good for Hong Kong would be good 
for the mainland (although this has been proved arguable earlier in this chapter). 
What Hong Kong and China need to understand: Different interpretations of 
terms and concepts 
The problem of Hongkongers' 'assertion' being viewed as 'subversion' by 
mainland Chinese leaders can be attributed to their different interpretations of the terms 
'patriotism' and 'nationalism'. To China, patnotism and nationalism require 
"unconditional support for the actions of the Chinese govenunent", whereas 
Hongkongers feel that "allegiance to their country needs not to extend to approval of its 
government" (DeGolyer, 1993, p.274). This reflects that people of Hong Kong perceive 
the term 'democracy' in its purest fonn, where everyone in a society has a right to 
participate in making every decision regarding state policies (Xrefer.com, 2002). One 
the other hand, China takes 'democracy' to mean that sovereign power resides in and is 
exercised by the proletariat class directly or indirectly through a system of 
representation (Morikawa, n.d.). To borrow Morikawa's (n.d.) term, there is "internal 
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democracy" for all except those who are opposed to the CCP government. By virtue of 
such definitions, China tends to see those who protest against state po1icies as 
opponents, or even subversives. 
Apart from being pro-democracy (in their own definition), what has made 
Hongkongers assertive and persistent about their rights and freedoms is that they have 
been granted a 'high degree of autonomy' by China. This is guaranteed in both the 
Sino-British Joint Declaration (an agreement signed by China and Britain in 1984) and 
the Basic Law, Hong Kong's mini-constitution in the post-1997 era. A 'high degree of 
autonomy' contains the concept of 'self-rule', which is another term open for 
misinterpretation. On one hand, 'self-rule' means "full independence", which is the 
way Hongkongers perceive the term (Harris, 1988, p.234). A survey by Ma and Fung 
(1999, p.519) has reaffirmed Harris' assertion, where 68 percent of the respondents 
agreed that the SAR should be free of the central govenunent's interference, and over 
80 percent assented to the item "mainlanders should not attempt to use their standards to 
change Hong Kong people". Nevertheless, to China, 'self-rule' is a "mere euphemism 
for something more akin to subordinate status" (Harris, 1988, p.234). Harris (p.234) 
further explains that China's definition of 'self-rule' originates from the ancient Chinese 
empire, which was "well aware of the role of tributary states within an overall 
suzerainty''. It would seem that Hanis' assessment of China's view on 'self-rule' is 
applicable to the years following the handover, taking into account the interferences in 
Hong Kong's affairs by the Chinese government despite the promise of a 'high degree 
of autonomy'. 
The problem with a 'high degree of autonomy' seems to echo Hong Kong's last 
governor Christopher Patten's remarks on the Sino-British Joint Declaration - "the 
mystery begins when Chinese officials start to say what they think that means" (Patten, 
1996, p.281). Expressing a similar concern, Foster (1997) asserts that 'freedom of the 
press', which is also enshrined in the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, is simply an 
"illusory promise". He points out that in the original Chinese-language text of China's 
constitution, the term 'freedom of the press' only refers to the acknowledgement that 
freedom is granted to the act of publishing (chuban), but does not extend to freedom of 
seeking and obtaining information. In addition, the government's authority to constrain 
or annul its promises is 'protected' by Article 51 of China's constitution, which 
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prohibits the citizens from any infringement upon societal or state interests when 
exercising their guaranteed rights and freedoms (Constitution of the People's Republic 
of China, 1994, p.36). These explain why the editorial independence of the mainland 
media is tightly controlled and interfered with by the Chinese government, even though 
there exists the promise of'freedom of the press'. Chinese President Jiang Zemin has 
also specifically stressed that "there is no press in the world that is not subject to laws" 
(Fong, 1996). 
Applying such a definition to Hong Kong, China has extended its pressures to 
the territory's press as well (as discussed in Chapter One). However, the Basic Law 
gives China no reasonable ground to do so. Article 27 of the English version of the 
Basic Law states that Hong Kong residents shall enjoy freedom of the press and of 
publication (Committee on the Promotion of Civic Education, 1999, p.l08). In the 
Chinese version, 'the press' is translated as "xinwen", meaning news infonnation; and 
'publication' is translated as "chuban", referring to the act of publishing (Committee on 
the Promotion of Civic Education, p. 79). The clear separation of the terms 'the press' 
(or 'xinwen') and 'publication' (or 'chuban') implies that they hold different meanings 
and that they are not interchangeable in either the English or Chinese version. Thus, the 
SAR media are allowed to report and publish any news items freely in accordance to the 
Basic Law. 
What China needs to understand: The Hong Kong media's perception of social 
responsibility 
The different interpretations of the term 'freedom of the press' result in two 
different modes of press operation as well as differing perceptions of 'social 
responsibility' between Hong Kong and China. President Jiang gave a speech on how 
the media in Hong Kong and Macau should operate. He advised them to heed their 
'social responsibility', which is to aid the mainland in promoting values such as loyalty 
to the nation as well as working towards economic and social stability (Wong, 2000b). 
In response to Jiang's speech, the pro-democracy paper Apple Daily ran an editorial 
elaborating on the SAR's own perception of 'social responsibility'. The paper asserted 
that it is part of the media's obligation to provide the public with different voices, 
including "the most radical, reactionary and anachronistic" (Lo, 2000e). It is because 
this is the only way in which readers can make informed opinions and judgements by 
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sifting through a host of differing opinions. Apple Daily further commented that the 
Hong Kong media would tum out to be irresponsible only when they were given a 
"political mission"- to suppress opinions and reports which are 'politically incorrect' in 
the eyes ofthe CCP (Lo, 2000e). 
Remarkably, newspapers with different political orientations from Apple Daily 
also hold the same belief. For instance, the South China Morning Post (SCMP or the 
Post) made a similar comment in its editorial on Chinese official Wang Fengchao's 
warnings to the SAR media on Taiwan reports. It emphasized that accurate reporting is 
necessary for readers to make intelligent decisions ("Dangerous policy", 2000). 
Surveys on Hong Kong journalists by Chan, Lee and Lee (1996, p.87) have also shown 
that an overwhelming majority of their respondents regard "objective reporting" and the 
role of "neutral disseminator" as important. 
In addition, local media outlets, regardless of their political inc1inations, 
generally believe that it is their social responsibility to serve as a watchdog of 
government and dignitaries (Chan, Lee & Lee, 1996, p.90). This belief is a mirror of 
the concept of the 'Fourth Estate', whereby the news media act as the fourth branch of 
the government (the other three being executive, legislative, and judiciary), keeping the 
government in check so that it does not abuse its power. According to Schultz (1998, 
p.6), the Fourth Estate should always be "watching, questioning, analysing and 
infonning" in order to ensure that the govenunent will enforce the current rule of law. 
Indeed, renowned for their outspokenness and investigative spirit, the Hong Kong 
media accept a "participant-interpretive" role, where they will speak for the people as 
well as analyse and interpret complex issues (Chan, et al., p.87). 
With the increasingly close ties between media proprietors and Beijing (as 
discussed in Chapter One) and the growing sensationalism found in certain newspapers, 
the idea of the local press being the Fourth Estate can be questioned; however, there 
have been cases showing that the press does fulfil this role from much of the time as far 
as Hong Kong is concerned. In July 2000, Robert Chung of the University of Hong 
Kong alleged in the SCMP that Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa had attempted to gag 
his opinion polls on Tung's popularity via a "special channel" (Hong Kong Journalists 
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Association [HKJA) & Article 19, 2001, p.l6). Apparently, Tung's senior special 
assistant Andrew Lo raised doubts on Chung's polls during a meeting with the 
university's vice-chancellor Cheng Yiu Chung. Cheng and Professor Wong Siu Lun 
were later found guilty by an inquiry panel for trying to put a stop to Robert Chung's 
polls and inhibiting his right to academic freedom. They resigned from the university 
under public pressure (HKJA & Article 19, p.l6). Another recent example is a scandal 
involving former legislative councillor Gary Cheng Kai Nam. Apple Daily revealed that 
Gary Cheng had failed to declare a consultancy company that he had set up for more 
than two years, and had leaked confidential government documents to a business 
contact (Cheung, 2000). He bowed to the pressure formed by the media and the public, 
and relinquished all his public and political positions. At the end of2001, Gary Cheng 
was convicted and sentenced to prison on four counts (Or & Choi, 2001). 
As can be seen, Hong Kong reporters favour and adopt western journalistic 
practises and liberal ideologies. This is partly due to the fact that Hong Kong's laissez-
fa ire media is a legacy of British rule. According to Lo (1998), the colonial state 
allowed the pluralistic existence of leftist (pro-China), rightist (pro-Taiwan) and centrist 
press because they could "check and balance the influence among themselves". As a 
result, an image of protecting freedom of the speech and of the press was created. The 
traces of western influence can also be attributed to the style of education Hong Kong 
journalists receive. Journalism education in the territory adopts an American style of 
curriculum and teaching materials, due to the fact that a significant number of teaching 
staff getting their degrees in communication from major universities in the United States 
(Chan, Lee & Lee, 1996, p.59). Moreover, many young people who cannot get through 
the narrow entrances of the local universities opt to further their studies in Taiwan, in 
which journalism education is equally American-influenced (Chan, et al., p.55). 
Being western-influenced does not mean that the SAR media are anti-China, just 
as the same theory applies to the territory's citizens in general. In fact, they played a 
vital role in "re-sinicisation", a process of nationalisation among Hongkongers during 
the run-up to 1997 (Ma & Fung, 1999, p.511). The media "rediscovered" the territory's 
cultural, historical and economic ties with the mainland in the wake of the political 
transition; they presented icons and images of China, so as to "accelerate a mainland 
blending into the Hong Kong cultural mosaic" and help "refigure and reproduce the 
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cultural transfonnation" (Ma & Fung, p.512). It suggests that the SAR media are not 
troublemakers who only know how to satirise and criticise the Chinese leaders, and 
break 'unfavourable' or 'sensitive' news about China. Rather, they can serve as 
intennediaries, promoting mutual understanding between the territory and its 
motherland. In this way, the Hong Kong media are also fulfilling Beijing's 
interpretation of 'social responsibility', as they are promoting national unity through 
their re-sinicisation efforts. 
What Hong Kong needs to understand: China's steps towards liberalisation and 
greater tolerance of press freedom 
China's strict control over the mainland media, increasing interference in the 
Hong Kong press and its continuing suppression of dissent seem to suggest that it will 
require some time for the country to reach a compromise on press freedom with the 
SAR. However, there are encouraging signs showing that China is willing to step 
towards liberalisation, and perhaps greater tolerance towards press freedom. One such 
sign is China's entry to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The granting of China's 
WTO membership was mainly due to the country's agreement to "undertake a series of 
important commitments to open and liberalise its regime", in which China is required to 
revise its existing domestic law and enact new laws that are fully compliant with the 
WTO agreement (World Trade Organisation, 2001). As Cao (2000) mentions in Asia 
Week, international trade and investment demand "legal transparency, political openness 
and clean government". Given China's current business environment where corrupt 
practices are rampant and government policies are opaque, the mainland needs to 
implement refonns in order to comply with WTO standards. Cao (2000) further 
suggests that a free press will play a vital role in improving the efficiency of China's 
fight against corruption, by providing a channel for citizens to expose corrupt practices. 
In this case, China will inevitably have to grant the mainland media greater press 
freedom not only to the act of publishing but also to freedom of content. 
Like its entry to the WTO, China's successful bid for the 2008 Olympic Garnes 
will also bring about economic growth as well as liberalisation. The western media 
generally believed that Beijing's failure to win the 2000 Olympics bid in 1993 was a 
result of its unfavourable 'human rights' record, especially the fresh memory of the 
Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 (Towson, 2001). Indeed, there were calls for votes 
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against Beijing by the European and American press during the bidding process 
(Korporaal, 2001). Thus, China's victory in this recent bid implies that the West has 
acknowledged China's improvement in its 'human rights' record, despite the fact that 
the International Olympic Committee (lOC) had received e-mails and letters from 
human rights groups opposing Beijing's successful bid (Korporaal, 2001). More 
importantly, China has promised a "gradual loosening of restrictions on reporters", 
whereby it will ensure "complete freedom" for those who will come to cover the Games 
(Gilley, 2001, p.30). From this statement alone, it can be concluded that journalists 
from Hong Kong would also be granted the same freedom of reporting as their foreign 
counterparts. 
Conclusion 
When it comes to the adoption of western values, China and Hong Kong hold 
different attitudes. The former is opposed to the idea partly because of its own 
econormc success achieved without wholesale adoption of the capitalist system. 
Moreover, China insists on the republican principle that everything is subject to law, 
including the God-given and unalienable 'human rights' which the West advocates. 
China's emphasis on national pride and its antipathy towards colonialism and western 
imperialism are other contributory factors. On the other side of the fence, the political 
stability and robust economy which flourished under British rule have made 
Hongkongers in general western-minded and pro-democracy. Distrust has then been 
developed when China mistook the territory's 'pro-democracy' stance as 'anti-China'. 
The development of distrust can be attributed to the different ways of how the 
two places interpret certain terms, with 'freedom of the press' being one of those. This 
leads to different perceptions ofthe media's social responsibility by the SAR media and 
by the Chinese government, which can be considered as a main cause for the 'tug-of-
war'. Conflicts arise when one sees the media as institutions to prevent abuses of power, 
whereas the other sees them as tools for promoting state policies and enhancing 
nationalistic sentiments. 
While insisting on its socialist ideals, China is gradually stepping towards 
liberalisation, which will speed up political restructuring. Its recent entry to the World 
Trade Organisation and its successful bid for the 2008 Olympics provide hope for 
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Beijing journalists who wish to be granted greater press freedom, as well as hope for the 
disappearance of China's interference in the Hong Kong media. 
Conclusion 55 
CONCLUSION 
The tug-of-war over press freedom in Hong Kong had assumed an air of urgency 
following Wang Fengchao's remarks, President Jiang's 'lecture' and the removal of 
Willy Lam. Press freedom advocates were particularly concerned with the future state 
of the SAR's media, as those three incidents occurred within the year 2000. The 
interferences from Beijing were thus construed as a stepping up of the central 
government's attempts to rein in the /aissezfaire press system of Hong Kong to 
confonn to the strict press model in the mainland. 
While many critics believe that self-censorship poses a great threat to press 
freedom in Hong Kong, some argue that censorship is the main nemesis of the SAR 
journalists. There have been studies backed by facts and figures which reveal that self-
censorship has been practiced by a number of journalists. The case study of Lam's 
removal from the South China Morning Post is confinnation in this long-running debate, 
corroborating that the practice of censorship exists. The rejection of two 'sensitive' 
columns by the Past's editors, and the removal of Willy Lam are examples of editorial 
censorship and managerial censorship respectively. 
Closely related to the 'self-censorship debate' is the controversy over the link 
between proprietorial influence and the paper's political direction. Some attribute the 
alleged kowtowing stance of the SCMP and Ming Paa to the influence of their 
respective owners Robert Kuok Hock Nien and Tiong Hiew King, who both have 
'patriotic sentiments' towards China as well as substantial economic interests in the 
mainland. Indeed, proprietorial influence seems to be at work in these two papers when 
one compares the headlines of their reports on the Wang and Jiang cases, to those of the 
pro-democracy paper Apple Daily. This argument is further underpinned by the 
qualitative analysis of how the two cases were covered by these three dailies, with 
Apple Daily standing out as the bluntest and most confrontational. It is no surprise, as 
its owner Jimmy Lai Chi Ying is a freedom advocate who encourages criticism even on 
Chinese leaders. 
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The toning down of the coverage on China and the removal of Willy Lam 
suggest that Beijing has built up a lead in the tug-of-war over press freedom in Hong 
Kong by the end of the fourth year after the handover. However, by looking on the 
other side of the issue, this thesis has pointed out that the center marker of the rope did 
not move too far away from the pro-press freedom side. Through presenting certain 
prominent figures' verbal comments and public reactions to the Wang, Jiang and Lam 
incidents, the SAR's resistance to China's interference in the press has been shown as 
significant. These figures, namely Martin Lee, Emily Lau, Anson Chan and the Hong 
Kong Journalists Association, were not fighting alone. They had received support from 
other groups and individuals in the territory, as well as from the international 
community. 
A qualitative analysis of Apple Daily, Ming Pao and the SCMP's editorials on 
the Wang and Jiang cases brings about a more encouraging sign. Despite their 
differences in nature and the controversies over the latter two dailies' changing political 
stances, all of the three papers showed their strong support for press freedom in their 
editorials. They reached a consensus that Wang Fengchao's remarks on Taiwan reports 
and President Jiang's accusation of the SAR journalists for asking simple and nai've 
questions, were not acceptable. Ming Pao was almost as assertive as Apple Daily when 
criticising Wang's advice and defending the professionalism of the Hong Kong 
journalists. While the SCMP did not explicitly express its disagreement with the two 
Chinese officials, the subtle objection was noticeable. 
Hong Kong's resistance to China's interference in press freedom is largely due 
to the significance of preserving a free press in the territory. This can be examined from 
social, political and economic perspectives. From the social point of view, press 
freedom is essential to enhance the SAR reporters' confidence in the local journalistic 
circle. Aside from the existing unsatisfactory working conditions like low pay, the lack 
of autonomy caused by Beijing's intervention is observed to be another factor that 
frustrates journalists and encourages them to leave the profession. In fact, China's 
respect for rights and freedoms of all kinds would not only prevent a loss of good 
journalists, but also a loss of other skilled and talented local professionals, many of 
whom have left Hong Kong after being unnerved by the Tiananmen Square massacre in 
1989. 
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The Tiananmen Square massacre on one hand shook Hongkongcrs' confidence 
in the Chinese government. However, it also began their political awakening and 
deepened their desire for democracy. Many post-Tiananmen studies and real-life cases 
have shown that the people of Hong Kong have become bolder and more assertive when 
it comes to defending their liberties. Thus, a massive upheaval is likely to result if press 
freedom and other guaranteed civil rights were to be taken away. This would endanger 
the territory's social and political stability, and hence adversely disrupt its dynamic 
economy. Some observers point out that stability, together with the climate of freedom 
and the free market economy in Hong Kong, are the main factors attracting foreign 
investments. In particular, a free press that provides uncensored and accurate 
information plays a vital role in maintaining the investors' trust and confidence in the 
territory. It also serves as a reliable source on China news for overseas Chinese. 
Moreover, with Singapore's challenge for the status as the regional media centre and 
China's Iiberalisation of its economy, press freedom seems to be one of the main 
safeguards to sustain the SAR's competitive edge. 
Apart from understanding the importance of preserving press freedom in Hong 
Kong, it is necessary for China and the SAR to develop a better understanding of each 
other, in order to put an end to the 'tug-of-war'. Based on its own economic success 
and political stability achieved under colonial rule, it is understandable that Hong Kong 
tends to believe that certain western values such as the capitalist system and respect for 
'human rights' are universal and would be good for China as well. However, China has 
various reasons to reject this belief. It has achieved steady and remarkable economic 
growth under a socialist system in recent years. Moreover, as a republic, the western 
concept of inalienable 'human rights' has no legal weight in China. 
Without realising the 'non-universality' of western liberal concepts, 
Hongkongers have consistently called for speedier democratisation in both the territory 
and the mainland. Well-known for its sensitivity, China has translated their pro-
democracy spirit into an 'anti-nationalistic' sentiment, and hence developed distrust 
towards the territory. What also accounts for the development of distrust is that the two 
places interpret key terms in different ways. Together with their anTerent 
interpretations of the term 'freedom of the press', their differing perceptions of the 
media's social responsibility, partially explain the origins of the 'tug-of-war'. Being 
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westem-im'1uenced, the SAR media's r·~rception of fulfilling their social responsibility 
lies in serving as a watchdog of government. They sirongiy oppose taking up the role of 
being a government mouthpiece, as which socialist China regards the mainland media. 
Despite its preference for socialism, China is integrating into the international 
community, stepping towards liberalisation. With its entry to the World Trade 
Organisation and its successful bid for the 2008 Olympics, China will inevitably have to 
inure itself to certain western liberal concepts, including press freedom. This provides 
an optimistic view of the 'tug-of-war', bringing a silver lining to the cloud that seems to 
hover over the future of press freedom in Hong Kong. 
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